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ABSTRACT 
In June 2013, through an unauthorized disclosure to the media by 
ex-NSA contractor Edward Snowden, the public learned that the NSA, since 
2006, had been collecting nearly all domestic phone call detail records and 
other telephony metadata pursuant to a controversial, classified 
interpretation of Section 215 of the USA PATRIOT Act. Prior to the 
Snowden disclosure, the existence of this intelligence program had been 
kept secret from the general public, though some members of Congress 
knew both of its existence and of the statutory interpretation the government 
was using to justify the bulk collection.  Unfortunately, the classified nature 
of the Section 215 metadata program prevented them from alerting the 
public directly, so they were left to convey their criticisms of the program 
directly to certain federal agencies as part of a non-public oversight 
process. The efficacy of an oversight regime burdened by such strict secrecy 
is now the subject of justifiably intense debate. In the context of that debate, 
this Article examines a very different surveillance technology—one that has 
been used by federal, state and local law enforcement agencies for more 
than two decades without invoking even the muted scrutiny Congress 
applied to the Section 215 metadata program. During that time, this 
technology has steadily and significantly expanded the government’s 
surveillance capabilities in a manner and to a degree to date largely 
unnoticed and unregulated.  Indeed, it has never been explicitly authorized 
                                                
1 “A little more than kin, and less than kind.” WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, HAMLET act 1, sc. 
2. 
2 The authors would like to thank Susan Freiwald and Jim Green for their feedback and 
assistance. 
* Principal, SKP Strategies, LLC; Non-resident Fellow at Stanford Law School’s Center 
for Internet and Society; former Counsel to the House Judiciary Committee; former Senior 
Counsel to the Deputy Attorney General, U.S. Department of Justice; former Counsel to 
the Assistant Attorney General, National Security Division, U.S. Department of Justice; 
and former Assistant U.S. Attorney, Southern District of Florida. 
** Principal Technologist, Speech, Privacy & Technology Project, American Civil 
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by Congress for law enforcement use. This technology, commonly called the 
StingRay, the most well-known brand name of a family of surveillance 
devices, enables the government, directly and in real-time, to intercept 
communications data and detailed location information of cellular 
phones—data that it would otherwise be unable to obtain without the 
assistance of a wireless carrier. Drawing from the lessons of the StingRay, 
this Article argues that if statutory authorities regulating law enforcement 
surveillance technologies and methods are to have any hope of keeping 
pace with technology, some formalized mechanism must be established 
through which complete, reliable and timely information about new 
government surveillance methods and technologies can be brought to the 
attention of Congress. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Beginning in June 2013, the details of several National Security 
Agency (NSA) classified surveillance programs were revealed in a series of 
articles by journalists who had received documents from ex-NSA contractor 
Edward Snowden.3 Among the many disclosures and subsequent releases of 
information by the Administration and Members of Congress was the 
revelation that, since 2006, the NSA has been collecting domestic call detail 
records and other domestic telephony metadata4 in bulk, pursuant to a 
controversial interpretation of Section 215 of the USA PATRIOT Act 
                                                
3 See Glenn Greenwald, NSA Collecting Phone Records of Millions of Verizon Customers 
Daily, THE GUARDIAN, June 5, 2013, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/06/nsa-
phone-records-verizon-court-order (“The National Security Agency is currently collecting 
the telephone records of millions of US customers of Verizon, one of America’s largest 
telecoms providers, under a top secret court order issued in April.”); see also Danny 
Yadron and Evan Perez, T-Mobile, Verizon Wireless Shielded from NSA Sweep, WALL ST. 
J., June 14, 2013, 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887324049504578543800240266368.html 
(explaining that the NSA “doesn't collect information directly from T-Mobile USA and 
Verizon Wireless . . . [but the NSA] still capture[s] information, or metadata, on 99% of 
U.S. phone traffic because nearly all calls eventually travel over networks owned by U.S. 
companies that work with the NSA”). 
4 The Administration defines this telephony metadata as including “information about what 
telephone numbers were used to make and receive the calls, when the calls took place, and 
how long the calls lasted. . . . [T]his information does not include any information about the 
content of those calls—the Government cannot, through this program, listen to or record 
any telephone conversations.” Administration White Paper: Bulk Collection of Telephony 
Metadata Under Section 215 of the USA Patriot Act on Section 215, at 2 (Aug. 9, 2013) 
[hereinafter Administration White Paper on Section 215], 
http://info.publicintelligence.net/DoJ-NSABulkCollection.pdf. 
3
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(PATRIOT Act).5 Section 215 is an intelligence collection authority 
permitting the government to compel “tangible things” from third parties 
that are “relevant” to an “authorized investigation” in order: (1) “to obtain 
foreign intelligence information not concerning a United States person”; or 
(2) to “protect against international terrorism or clandestine intelligence 
activities.”6 The public has also learned that this massive quantity of data is 
collected and stored in a centralized database in order to enable future 
searches by the NSA—that is, if and when there is a reasonable articulable 
suspicion that an identifier (e.g. a phone number) is associated with a 
particular foreign terrorist organization7 or with terrorism.8 The goal of the 
program is “to enable the government to identify communications among 
known and unknown terrorism suspects, particularly those located inside 
the United States.”9 
                                                
5 For the most complete factual and legal explanation of the 215 metadata program from 
the Administration to date, see Administration White Paper on Section 215, supra note 4. 
Since the time the Administration chose to declassify and disclose the Section 215 White 
Paper to the public, two different federal district courts have issued dueling opinions on the 
legality of this intelligence program. See ACLU v. Clapper, No. 13-3994 (WHP) (S.D.N.Y. 
Dec. 27, 2013) (holding that the 215 bulk collection metadata program is lawful as both a 
statutory and constitutional matter); Klayman v. Obama, No. 13-0851 (RJL) (D.D.C. Dec. 
16, 2013) (finding that the plaintiffs have demonstrated a substantial likelihood of success 
on a claim that the Section 215 metadata program violates the Fourth Amendment). 
6 50 U.S.C. § 1861(a)(1). 
7 See Transcript: Newseum Special Program—NSA Surveillance Leaks: Facts and Fiction 
8 (June 26, 2013) (statement of Robert Litt, General Counsel of the Office of Director of 
National Intelligence), http://www.dni.gov/index.php/newsroom/speeches-and-
interviews/195-speeches-interviews-2013/887-transcript-newseum-special-program-nsa-
surveillance-leaks-facts-and-fiction (“The metadata that is acquired and kept under this 
program can only be queried when there is reasonable suspicion, based on specific, 
articulable facts, that a particular telephone number is associated with specified foreign 
terrorist organizations. And the only purpose for which we can make that query is to 
identify contacts.”); see also Laura K. Donohue, Bulk Metadata Collection: Statutory and 
Constitutional Considerations, 37 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y (forthcoming 2013), 
http://justsecurity.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/Just-Security-Donohue-PDF.pdf 
(explaining that the Foreign Intelligence Court (FISC) “requires that the NSA establish a 
‘reasonable, articulable suspicion’ that a seed identifier used to query the data be linked to 
a foreign terrorist organization before running it against the bulk data. Once obtained, 
information responsive to the query can be further mined for information. The NSA can 
analyze the data to ascertain second- and third-tier contacts, in steps known as ‘hops.’”). 
8 Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board (PCLOB) Report on the Telephone Records 
Program Conducted under Section 215 of the USA PATRIOT Act and on the Operations of 
the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court 8-9, 
http://www.pclob.gov/SiteAssets/Pages/default/PCLOB-Report-on-the-Telephone-
Records-Program.pdf [hereinafter PCLOB Report]. 
9 Id. at 8. 
4
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One major criticism of this domestic surveillance program is that the 
“common sense” reading of the statutory text of Section 215 does not, on its 
face, appear to permit collection on this scale. More specifically, critics 
argue that the contents of an entire massive database of records—in this 
case the records of nearly every domestic telephone call10—cannot simply 
                                                
10 See Yadron and Perez, supra note 3. But see Ellen Nakashima, NSA is Collecting Less 
Than 30 Percent of U.S. Call Data, Officials Say, WASH. POST, Feb. 7, 2014, 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/nsa-is-collecting-less-than-30-
percent-of-us-call-data-officials-say/2014/02/07/234a0e9e-8fad-11e3-b46a-
5a3d0d2130da_story.html (“The National Security Agency is collecting less than 30 
percent of all Americans’ call records because of an inability to keep pace with the 
explosion in cellphone use, according to current and former U.S. officials. . . . In 2006, a 
senior U.S. official said, the NSA was collecting ‘closer to 100’ percent of Americans’ 
phone records from a number of U.S. companies.”). For the sake of argument, suppose we 
assume those sources are correct and the NSA is collecting call records pertaining to no 
more than 30 percent of all domestic calls (presumably not much less, since the officials 
who were the sources of that figure in the article certainly did not choose that number 
arbitrarily but according to some rationale regarding an upper limit the government feels it 
can defend in attempting to mitigate larger figures claimed by other authors to date).  Such 
a figure would still describe a sample justifiably characterized as “massive” in size, leaving 
the necessity, much less the legality, of collecting a cache of information so large, still 
quite open to question, whether or not some of the records in question are found to be 
actually relevant to an investigation. 
 
The Administration has attempted to defend its interpretation of relevance:  
 
It is well-settled in the context of other forms of legal process for the 
production of documents that a document is “relevant” to a particular 
subject matter not only where it directly bears on that subject matter, but 
also where it is reasonable to believe that it could lead to other 
information that directly bears on that subject matter. . . . 
 In light of that basic understanding of relevance, courts have 
held that the relevance standard permits requests for the production of 
entire repositories of records, even when any particular record is unlikely 
to directly bear on the matter being investigated, because searching the 
entire repository is the only feasible means to locate the critical 
documents. More generally, courts have concluded that the relevance 
standard permits discovery of large volumes of information in 
circumstances where the requester seeks to identify much smaller 
amounts of information within the data that directly bears on the matter. 
Federal agencies exercise broad subpoena powers or other authorities to 
collect and analyze large data sets in order to identify information that 
directly pertains to the particular subject of an investigation. Finally, in 
the analogous field of search warrants for data stored on computers, 
courts permit Government agents to copy entire computer hard drives and 
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be deemed relevant because some of the records in that database are actually 
relevant to an investigation.11 
                                                                                                                       
 
Administration White Paper on Section 215, at 9-10, supra note 4 (internal citations 
omitted). 
11 See Orin Kerr, The Problem With the Administration “White Paper” on the Telephony 
Metadata Program, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Aug. 12, 2013, 2:34 PM), 
http://www.volokh.com/2013/08/12/problem-withthe-administration-white-paper-on-the-
telephony-metadata-program (arguing that the Administration position as expressed in its 
Section 215 White Paper does not adequately address “whether a massive database of 
billions of records can be deemed ‘relevant’ because some records inside the database are 
relevant”); see also Brief of Amicus Curiae, Professors of Information Privacy and 
Surveillance Law at 10-17, In Re Electronic Privacy Information Center, No. 13-58 (Aug. 
12, 2013), http://www.law.indiana.edu/front/etc/section-215-amicus-8.pdf (arguing that 
call detail records and telephone metadata on all domestic Verizon calls could not be 
relevant to an authorized investigation); Donohue, supra note 7, at 48-49 (arguing that the 
telephony metadata program “violates the express statutory language . . . with regard to the 
language ‘relevant to an authorized investigation’; [and, among other ways,] in relation to 
[Section 215’s] requirement that the information sought can be obtained under subpoena 
duces tecum”).  
 
In a recently declassified March 2009 Order from the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance 
Court (FISC), authorizing domestic bulk collection of metadata under Section 215, Chief 
Judge Reggie Walton acknowledges that the bulk collection of metadata “pertaining to 
communications of United States (‘U.S.’) persons located within the U.S. who are not the 
subject of an FBI investigation” could “not otherwise be legally captured in bulk.” In re 
Production of Tangible Things From [REDACTED], No. BR 08-13, at 2-3 (FISA Ct. Mar. 




Nevertheless, the FISC appears to authorize the program because of: 
 
(1) the government’s explanation, under oath of how the collection of and 
access to such data are necessary to analytical methods that are vital to 
the national security of the United States; and (2) minimization 
procedures that carefully restrict access to the BR metadata and includes 
specific oversight requirements. 
 
Id. at 11-12. 
 
Three Members of the PCLOB (Chairman David Medine and Board Members Jim 
Dempsey and Judge Patricia Wald have concluded that the 215 metadata program fails to 
comply with Section 215’s statutory language.  The major arguments for the program’s 
non-compliance with Section 215 of the PATRIOT Act can be summarized as follows: 
 
First, the telephone records acquired under the program have no 
connection to any specific FBI investigation at the time of their 
 
6
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While the existence of this intelligence program had been kept from 
the general public prior to the summer 2013 Snowden disclosures and 
subsequent declassification of information by the Executive branch, some 
members of Congress knew of its existence and were privy to the statutory 
interpretation the government was employing to justify the bulk collection 
of domestic telephone records. Indeed, during a floor debate in 2011, 
Senator Ron Wyden warned his colleagues that “when the American people 
find out how their government has secretly interpreted the PATRIOT Act, 
they will be stunned and they will be angry.”12  
As this Article goes to print, the Executive and Legislative branches 
of government are finally engaging the public in a much more robust, 
transparent discussion about the Section 215 metadata program. Moreover, 
                                                                                                                       
collection. Second, because the records are collected in bulk potentially 
encompassing all telephone calling records across the nation they cannot 
be regarded as “relevant” to any FBI investigation as required by the 
statute without redefining the word relevant in a manner that is circular, 
unlimited in scope, and out of step with the case law from analogous legal 
contexts involving the production of records. Third, the program operates 
by putting telephone companies under an obligation to furnish new 
calling records on a daily basis as they are generated (instead of turning 
over records already in their possession) an approach lacking foundation 
in the statute and one that is inconsistent with FISA as a whole. Fourth, 
the statute permits only the FBI to obtain items for use in its 
investigations; it does not authorize the NSA to collect anything.  
 
PCLOB Report, supra note 8, at 10. 
 
Two other PCLOB Members (Elisebeth Collins Cook and Rachel Brand) did not agree, 
however, that the 215 metadata program lacked statutory authorization.  See Separate 
Statement by Board Member Elisebeth Collins Cook at 1, 
http://www.pclob.gov/SiteAssets/Pages/default/PCLOB-Cook-Statement.pdf; Separate 
Statement by Board Member Rachael Brand at 3, 
http://www.pclob.gov/SiteAssets/Pages/default/PCLOB-Brand-Statement.pdf. 
 
For a defense or more detailed analysis of the Administration’s interpretation of relevance 
under Section 215, see Steven G. Bradbury, Understanding the NSA Programs: Bulk 
Acquisition of Telephone Metadata Under Section 215 and Foreign-Targeted Collection 
Under Section 702, 1 LAWFARE RESEARCH PAPER SERIES (Sept. 1, 2013), 
http://www.lawfareblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/08/Bradbury-Vol-1-No-3.pdf; 
David S. Kris, On the Bulk Collection of Tangible Things, 1 LAWFARE RESEARCH PAPER 
SERIES (Sept. 29, 2013), http://www.lawfareblog.com/wp-
content/uploads/2013/09/Lawfare-Research-Paper-Series-No.-4-2.pdf.  
12 Press Release, Senator Ron Wyden, In Speech, Wyden Says Official Interpretations of 
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as the Administration continues declassification of Section 215-related 
documents, several Members of Congress are calling for reforms to the 
statute, some arguing for termination of the entire Section 215 bulk 
collection program.13 Even President Obama has suggested that the 
government should no longer hold the data, although the Administration has 
not yet taken a position on who or what entity should warehouse the 
voluminous call records and other telephony business records.14 
Meanwhile, a clearer picture of earlier cryptically worded criticisms 
of the program voiced by members of Congress has emerged. We now 
know that some members of Congress who were aware of the government’s 
legal interpretation of Section 215 actively urged the Executive branch to 
engage in a more public discussion of the issue in a manner that would not 
harm national security. In other words, as controversial as the Section 215 
program has come to be in light of the Snowden revelations, prior to those 
unauthorized disclosures an established process had already enabled at least 
some measure of congressional oversight and review.15 That process, in 
turn, enabled Senators Russ Feingold, Richard Durbin, Wyden, and Mark 
Udall to warn the public and other members of Congress that the 
                                                
13 See, e.g., The USA Freedom Act of 2013, S. 1599, 113th Cong. (2013); The USA 
Freedom Act of 2013, H.R. 3361, 113th Cong. (2013) (prohibiting bulk collection of 
American’s records by, among other things, limiting the use of Section 215 to records or 
tangible things pertaining to: “(A) a foreign power or agent of a foreign power, (B) the 
activities of a suspected agent of a foreign power who is the subject of . . . [an] authorized 
investigation, or (C) an individual in contact with, or known to, a suspected agent of a 
foreign power”). 
14 See President Obama’s Prepared Remarks on Signals Intelligence Programs 7 (Jan. 17, 
2014), http://justsecurity.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/01/President-Speech-on-
Intelligence-Reforms.pdf (“I am therefore ordering a transition that will end the Section 
215 bulk metadata program as it currently exists, and establish a mechanism that preserves 
the capabilities we need without the government holding this bulk meta-data.”); see also 
PCLOB Report, supra note 8, at 102 (“[S]anctioning the NSA’s program under Section 
215 requires an impermissible transformation of the statute . . . . Because Section 215 does 
not provide a sound legal basis for the NSA’s bulk telephone records program, we believe 
the program must be ended.”). But see Separate Statements of Board Members Elisebeth 
Collins Cook and Rachael Brand, supra note 11 (dissenting from the PCLOB’s 
recommendation to shut down the 215 metadata program).  
15 See The USA PATRIOT Act: Hearing before the Subcomm. on the Constitution, Civil 
Rights, and Civil Liberties of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 8 (2009) (oral 
testimony of Todd M. Hinnen, Deputy Assistant Attorney General), 
http://judiciary.house.gov/_files/hearings/printers/111th/111-35_52409.PDF (“The 
business records provision [Section 215] allows the government to obtain any tangible 
thing it demonstrates to the FISA court is relevant to a counterterrorism or 
counterintelligence investigation. . . . It also supports an important, sensitive collection 
program about which many members of the Subcommittee or their staffs have been 
briefed.”)  
8
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government was misusing its Section 215 authority, albeit in opaque and 
suggestive language necessitated by the classified status of the surveillance 
program.16 While it is fair to argue that congressional oversight of 
government intelligence programs is far from ideal, we must at least 
acknowledge that the government’s expansive interpretation and use of 
Section 215 was known and debated by some Members of Congress—some 
approving of the program,17 some not—even if it could not be directly 
named or described in public until after Edward Snowden’s disclosures. The 
efficacy of an oversight regime burdened by such strict secrecy is now the 
subject of justifiably intense debate. 
In the context of that debate, this Article examines a very different 
surveillance technology—one that has been used by federal, state and local 
law enforcement agencies for more than two decades without invoking even 
the muted scrutiny Congress applied to the 215 metadata program.18 In that 
time, this technology has steadily and significantly expanded the 
government’s surveillance capabilities in a manner and to a degree to date 
largely unnoticed and unregulated—indeed, it has never been explicitly 
authorized by Congress for law enforcement use.19 This technology, 
commonly called the StingRay, the most well-known brand name of a 
family of surveillance devices known more generically as “IMSI catchers,” 
is used by law enforcement agencies to obtain, directly and in real time, 
unique device identifiers and detailed location information of cellular 
phones—data that it would otherwise be unable to obtain without the 
                                                
16 See Christopher Soghoian, Senators Hint at DOJ’s Secret Reinterpretation and Use of 
Section 215 of the Patriot Act, SLIGHT PARANOIA, May 24, 2011, 
http://paranoia.dubfire.net/2011/05/senators-hint-at-dojs-secret.html (describing statements 
by Senators hinting at the existence of an alternate use of Section 215). 
17 See Ed O’Keefe, Transcript: Dianne Feinstein, Saxby Chambliss Explain, Defend NSA 
Phone Records Program, WASH. POST, June 6, 2013, 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/post-politics/wp/2013/06/06/transcript-dianne-
feinstein-saxby-chambliss-explain-defend-nsa-phone-records-program (defending the 215 
metadata program, Senator Dianne Feinstein stated, “As far as I know, this is the exact 
three month renewal of what has been the case for the past seven years. This renewal is 
carried out by the FISA Court under the business records section of the Patriot Act. 
Therefore, it is lawful.”). 
18 See Glen L. Roberts, Who’s On The Line? Cellular Phone Interception at its Best, FULL 
DISCLOSURE, (1991), archived at http://blockyourid.com/~gbpprorg/2600/harris.txt 
(describing the marketing by the Harris Corporation of TriggerFish passive surveillance 
devices to law enforcement agencies at the National Technical Investigators Association 
conference in 1991). 
19 See infra Part III.B. 
9
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assistance of a wireless carrier.20 Whether installed in a vehicle, mounted on 
a drone, or carried by hand, this unregulated and technologically 
unmediated surveillance technology can, for example, send signals through 
the walls of homes to locate and identify nearby cell phones without the 
assistance of a wireless carrier and without providing any notice to the 
targets of the surveillance operation.21 
This Article describes how the StingRay’s unmediated collection 
capabilities do not fit well into the post-9/11 (or, for that matter, pre-9/11) 
Pen Register and Trap and Trace statute (“Pen/Trap”),22 the criminal 
surveillance authority normally used by federal law enforcement agencies to 
acquire certain types of non-content communications data in real-time. The 
lack of specific statutory authorization has not, however, served as a 
practical barrier to use of this technology by law enforcement agencies. 
Indeed, for several years prior to the passage of the PATRIOT Act, the 
official Department of Justice (DOJ) policy was that, since no specific 
statutory or Fourth Amendment prohibition forbade the practice, law 
enforcement could use StingRays without any form of judicial oversight.23 
After the PATRIOT Act broadened the definitional section of the Pen/Trap 
statute, DOJ interpreted the statute to authorize the collection of nearly all 
non-content information exchanged between a mobile device and a cell 
tower and, accordingly, advised prosecutors to obtain a Pen/Trap order 
when employing IMSI-catchers in an investigation.24  
The StingRay, therefore, illustrates how the legislature’s authority 
can be effectively short-circuited when: (1) the government stretches 
existing statutory definitions to accommodate a new type of collection 
capability or surveillance technology not contemplated by Congress; and (2) 
there is no established mechanism to ensure legislative notice and review 
that would enable Congress affirmatively to choose whether or not to 
regulate the government’s use of new or existing surveillance methods and 
technologies.  
Drawing from the lessons of the StingRay, this Article argues that, if 
statutory authorities regulating law enforcement surveillance technologies 
                                                
20 See infra Part II.  Some IMSI catchers also have the capacity to intercept content 
communications, though we are unaware of any public evidence regarding the extent to 
which law enforcement uses this capacity, if at all. See infra note 46.   
21 Id. 
22 18 U.S.C. §§ 3121–3127 (2012). 
23 See infra Part III.B.  
24 See id. It is currently unclear from publically available information, however, when and 
under what circumstances DOJ—due to potential Fourth Amendment issues or other policy 
considerations—may advise prosecutors to seek additional types of judicial authorization 
under existing statutes.  
10
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and methods are to have any hope of keeping pace with technology, some 
formalized mechanism must be established through which complete, 
reliable and timely information about new and existing government 
surveillance methods and technologies shall be brought to the attention of 
Congress. That information, among other things, must include: (1) how the 
government interprets existing law to permit or, conversely, not to prohibit 
its use of a particular collection method; and (2) how it uses such 
technologies in criminal investigations. 
Moreover, through a discussion of how the StingRay has evaded 
formal congressional oversight, this Article identifies several specific 
characteristics of any new or existing surveillance technologies or methods 
that should guide Congress in assessing the need for new regulation, as well 
as periodic assessment of any potential need to update existing statutory 
authorities to accommodate technological change and innovation. Finally, 
under the theory that Congress cannot begin to address the policy 
challenges posed by new surveillance technologies in the absence of 
adequate notice about their existence and actual or reasonably likely use by 
law enforcement, this Article proposes a way for Congress to create a 
mechanism to ensure that it receives such notice. 
II. A BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF A STINGRAY AND ITS CAPABILITIES25 
Mobile phones communicate by radio signal with a wireless 
carrier’s network of cellular base stations or “cell sites.” These cell sites are 
generally located on cell towers that serve geographic areas of varying 
sizes.26 The regular communication between phone and cell sites enables 
the carrier to route calls, text messages and Internet data to and from a 
subscriber’s mobile phone. To facilitate this process, cellular phones 
periodically register themselves with the nearest cell site so that the network 
can connect incoming calls and text messages to the subscriber’s phone.27 
This registration process, as well as the act of making a call or transmitting 
data, automatically generates location data of varying degrees of 
precision.28 Government agencies can compel a provider to disclose 
                                                
25 For a more detailed technical description and analysis of the StingRay, see Stephanie K. 
Pell & Christopher Soghoian, Your Secret StingRay’s No Secret Anymore: The Vanishing 
Government Monopoly Over Cell Phone Surveillance and its Impact on National Security 
and Consumer Privacy (2014) (on file with the Journal).   
26 See Stephanie K. Pell & Christopher Soghoian, Can You See Me Now?: Toward 
Reasonable Standards for Law Enforcement Access to Location Data That Congress Could 
Enact, 27 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 117, 126 (2012).  
27 Id. at 126-27. 
28 Id. at 126-33. 
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location data, whether the data was automatically generated by the wireless 
carrier in the normal course of business or specifically created in response 
to a surveillance request to “ping” a phone.29 Such “carrier-assisted 
surveillance” can reveal a phone’s historical, current, or prospective 
location (e.g., real-time tracking),30 as well as other types of data, such as 
numbers called31 and the addresses of web pages viewed from a mobile 
device.32  
Carrier-assisted surveillance is not, however, the only means 
through which law enforcement can acquire such information. By 
impersonating a cellular network base station, a StingRay—a surveillance 
device that can be carried by hand, installed in a vehicle, or even mounted 
on a drone33— tricks all nearby phones and other mobile devices into 
identifying themselves (by revealing their unique serial numbers) just as 
                                                
29 Id. at 131-32. See also Comments of CTIA—The Wireless Association on U.S. 
Department of Justice Petition for Expedited Rulemaking at 17, In re Petition for Expedited 
Rulemaking To Establish Technical Requirements and Standards Pursuant to Section 
107(b) of the Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act, Docket No. RM-
11376 (FCC July 25, 2007), http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/ecfs/comment/view?id=5514711157 
(“Law enforcement routinely now requests carriers to continuously ‘ping’ wireless devices 
of suspects to locate them when a call is not being made . . . so law enforcement can 
triangulate the precise location of a device and [seek] the location of all associates 
communicating with a target.”); see also Devega v. State, 689 S.E.2d 293, 299 (Ga. 2010) 
(“[T]he investigators requested that Devega’s cell phone provider ‘ping’ his phone, 
which the officers described as sending a signal to the phone to locate it by its global 
positioning system (GPS). The company complied and informed the police that the phone 
was moving north on Cobb Parkway.”). 
30 See generally Pell & Soghoian, supra note 26, at 126-132. 
31 See generally collections of files posted at 
http://www.markey.senate.gov/documents/2013-10-03_ATT_re_Carrier.pdf and 
http://www.markey.senate.gov/documents/2013-12-09_VZ_CarrierResponse.pdf 
(describing their disclosure of real-time ‘pen register’ and ‘trap and trace’ data to law 
enforcement agencies). 
32 Id. See Christopher Soghoian, 8 Million Reasons for Real Surveillance Oversight, 
SLIGHT PARANOIA, Dec. 1, 2009, http://paranoia.dubfire.net/2009/12/8-million-reasons-for-
real-surveillance.html (quoting Paul Taylor, Electronic Surveillance Manager, Sprint 
Nextel, stating: “On the Sprint 3G network, we have IP data back 24 months, and we have, 
depending on the device, we can actually tell you what URL they went to.”) See also 
Verizon Wireless, Law Enforcement Resource Team (LERT), Apr. 20, 2009,  
http://info.publicintelligence.net/VerizonLawEnforcementResourceTeam.pdf 
(a presentation to law enforcement agencies by Verizon Wireless revealing that the 
company retains “IP destination information” for “30 days”). 
33 See Jennifer Valentino-DeVries, Judge Questions Tools That Grab Cellphone Data on 
Innocent People, WALL ST. J., Oct. 22, 2012, http://blogs.wsj.com/digits/2012/10/22/judge-
questions-tools-that-grab-cellphone-data-on-innocent-people (“StingRay equipment can be 
carried by hand or mounted on vehicles or even drones.”). 
12
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they would register with genuine base stations in the immediate vicinity.34 
As each phone in the area identifies itself, the StingRay can determine the 
location from which the signal came.35 The StingRay and other similar 
devices also have the capacity, if so configured, to intercept data transmitted 
and received by the phone, including the content of calls, text messages, 
numbers dialed, and web pages visited.36 This process is accomplished 
without any visual indication to the target that she is under surveillance or 
any mediating involvement on the part of the carrier whose network the 
StingRay is impersonating.37 In circumstances where the government either 
cannot acquire, or chooses not to compel, assistance from a provider, the 
StingRay may be the surveillance technique of choice.38 Moreover, unlike 
carrier-assisted surveillance, in which the third-party provider necessarily 
has knowledge of surveillance performed and copies of records disclosed at 
the request of law enforcement, the unmediated nature of the StingRay 
dictates that only the operator of the device has: (1) knowledge that an 
                                                
34 See Daehyun Strobel, IMSI Catcher, Seminar Work 17 (Ruhr-Universitat Bochum, 
2007), http://www.emsec.rub.de/media/crypto/attachments/files/2011/04/imsi_catcher.pdf 
(“An IMSI Catcher masquerades as a Base Station and causes every mobile phone of the 
simulated network operator within a defined radius to log in. With the help of a special 
identity request, it is able to force the transmission of the IMSI.”). 
35 In fact, a different device made by the same company that manufactures the StingRay is 
used to locate devices. However, for clarity’s sake, we use the term StingRay in this article 
to refer to all of the devices in that family of products. See Harris Corp., Sole Source 
Vendor Letter 6 (2008), http://egov.ci.miami.fl.us/Legistarweb/Attachments/48003.pdf 
(describing the Harris AmberJack Direction Finding System).  
36 See Harris Corp, Price List 4 (2008), https://info.publicintelligence.net/Harris-
SurveillancePriceList.pdf (listing an optional “GSM Intercept Software package” for the 
StingRay).  
37 See Executive Office for United States Attorneys, Cell Site Simulators, Triggerfish, Cell 
Phones, USA BOOK 18 (2008), 
https://www.aclu.org/pdfs/freespeech/cellfoia_release_074130_20080812.pdf (obtained 
through FOIA by the American Civil Liberties Union) (“A cell site simulator . . . is a 
mobile device that can electronically force a cell phone to register its telephone number 
(MIN), electronic serial number (ESN) and information about its location, when the phone 
is turned on. This can be done without the user knowing about it, and without involving the 
cell phone provider.”). USA Bulletins such as these are published by the Executive Office 
of United States Attorneys (EOUSA) and distributed to United States Attorney’s Offices 
across the country. They cover a range of topics and issues (like law enforcement 
surveillance methods) of interest to federal prosecutors, including new case law, law 
enforcement tools and practices, statutory authorities, and internal DOJ guidance. See also 
Strobel, supra note 34, at 21 (“In most cases, the [use of an IMSI catcher] cannot be 
recognized immediately by the subscriber.”). 
38 Intelligence agencies operating on foreign soil and thus presumably unable to compel the 
assistance of telephone companies could, for example, use a StingRay for communications 
interception. 
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interception ever took place;39 and (2) or access to the information 
intercepted. Thus, to the extent that telephone companies are able to act as a 
proxy for their customers’ privacy interests and may “push back” against 
overbroad or otherwise improper government surveillance,40 no such 
advocate exists for the target when a Stingray is used. In short, the 
unmediated nature of StingRay technology makes it essentially “invisible” 
in operation and leaves behind no retrievable trace that is subject to future 
detection.41 
Consider, for example, a situation where law enforcement agents 
can physically identify a target during the course of an investigation, but do 
not know the telephone she is currently using, perhaps because the target 
frequently cycles through disposable “burner” cell phones.42 Investigators 
can position a StingRay in the vicinity of the target to capture the unique 
serial number of the target’s phone.43 In this case, law enforcement collects 
the identifying data in real-time because the StingRay, masquerading as the 
                                                
39 In those circumstances where a court knowingly grants a Pen/Trap order authorizing law 
enforcement use of a StingRay in a criminal investigation, the judge would have 
knowledge that law enforcement intended to collect communications data but would not 
likely know when the surveillance occurred or the scope and amount of data collected. See 
infra Part III.B. for a discussion of federal magistrate opinions considering government 
applications to use cellular interception devices pursuant to the Pen/Trap statute.  
40 At a House Judiciary Committee hearing in 2011, Congressman Robert C. Scott asked 
Todd Hinnen, then the Acting Assistant Attorney General for National Security at the 
Department of Justice, “why would [a service provider] . . . have an incentive to hire 
lawyers to protect [their subscribers’ privacy] rights?” Mr. Hinnen responded by stating his 
belief that “telecommunication providers and Internet service providers take the privacy of 
their customers and subscribers very seriously and I think are often an effective proxy for 
defending those rights.” Permanent Provisions of the PATRIOT Act: Hearing Before the 
Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 
112th Cong. 69 (2011) (statement of Acting Assistant Att’y Gen. for National Security, 
Todd M. Hinnen), http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/printers/112th/112-15_65486.PDF. 
41 Cell Site Simulators, Triggerfish, Cell Phones, supra note 37, at 18 (“This can be done 
without the user knowing about it”). 
42 See The Wire: Amsterdam, at 00:42:23 (HBO television broadcast Oct. 10, 2004) (“They 
make a couple of calls with a burner, throw it away. Go on to the next phone, do the same.” 
“There’s more of those things laying around the streets of West Baltimore than empty 
vials.” “Well, how the fuck you supposed to get a wire up on that?” “Yeah, well, first it 
was payphone and pagers. Then it was cell phones and face-to-face meets. Now this. The 
motherfuckers do learn. Every time we come at them, they learn and adjust.”). 
43 See Complaint at 8 n.1, United States v. Arguijo et al. (N.D. Ill. Feb. 13, 2012) (under 
seal), http://www.justice.gov/usao/iln/pr/chicago/2013/pr0222_01d.pdf (“Law enforcement 
officers . . . used a digital analyzer device on three occasions in three different locations 
where Chaparro was observed to determine the IMSI associated with any cellular telephone 
being carried by Chaparro.”). 
14
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cell site with the strongest signal,44 receives the information immediately 
and directly as it is communicated by the mobile phones, leaving no trace of 
the interception with the third party provider.45 Moreover, while law 
enforcement may only seek to identify or locate the target’s mobile device, 
a StingRay will also, as a matter of course, collect data from many other 
mobile devices in the surrounding area.46 
III. IN BETWEEN OR BEYOND THE REACH OF STATUTORY LANGUAGE 
Perhaps the most disconcerting aspect of the Section 215 metadata 
program to some surveillance scholars, beyond the sheer volume of 
information that was collected about hundreds of millions of Americans’ 
domestic communications, is that a common sense reading of Section 215 
does not support the government’s interpretation that such broad, 
indiscriminate collection is permissible.47 Indeed, one lawmaker who was 
an author of the PATRIOT Act has stated, “the government must request 
specific records relevant to its investigation . . . . To argue otherwise renders 
the provision meaningless . . . . It’s like scooping up the entire ocean to 
guarantee you catch a fish.”48 The government’s interpretation of 
intelligence authorities, where we have come to expect (if not accept) a lack 
of transparency with respect to the type and scope of collection allowed 
                                                
44 See MMI Research Ltd v. Cellxion Ltd. & Ors., [2009] EWHC (Pat) 418, [140] (Wales), 
http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Patents/2009/418.html (“The [signal] strength of the 
simulated cell is maintained at a stronger value than the [signal] strength of the authentic 
network cells detected by the mobile to be tapped. When the mobile to be tapped begins to 
set up a call, the false cell, as the most powerful station, receives a request for a channel.”). 
45 See Strobel, supra note 34, at 5 (“The IMSI Catcher is an expensive device to identify, 
track and tap a mobile phone user in such a way, that even the network operator cannot 
notice anything.”). 
46 Although the focus of this essay is on certain legal and policy implications surrounding 
law enforcement collection of metadata via a StingRay, it is also worth noting that 
StingRay technology is capable of intercepting communications content. It remains 
unclear, however, which law enforcement agencies, if any, use such intercept capabilities 
during surveillance operations.  See Harris GCSD Price List, supra note 36, at 4 (listing an 
optional “Sting[R]ay GSM intercept software package” for sale).  
47 See Brief of Amicus Curie, Professors of Information Privacy and Surveillance Law, 
supra note 11, at 9 (“The government acknowledges that the vast majority of data collected 
under the Verizon Order has not been relevant to any investigation, and its argument that 
the NSA can assess relevance on its own after the data are collected violates the plain 
language of § 215.”). 
48 Jennifer Valentino-Devries and Siobhan Gorman, Secret Court’s Redefinition of 
‘Relevant’ Empowered Vast NSA Data-Gathering, WALL ST. J., July 8, 2013, 
http://online.wsj.com/article_email/SB10001424127887323873904578571893758853344-
lMyQjAxMTAzMDAwNzEwNDcyWj.html (quoting Rep. Sensenbrenner).  
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under various statutes, is not, however, the only area where such opacity 
exists. The StingRay, a surveillance technology that is used not only by the 
intelligence community, but also by the military and law enforcement 
agencies,49 raises some of the same transparency issues. Indeed, the 
StingRay’s capacity for invasive surveillance (i.e. sending signals through 
walls and into homes50 and overbroad collection of innocent third party 
information51) could well provoke the same kind of surprise and dismay 
with respect to the government’s interpretation of the Pen/Trap statute as 
sufficiently authorizing its use. This Part will describe those issues after 
first discussing real-time cell phone tracking as an example of how 
surveillance methods can fall into interpretive gaps within and between 
statutes.  
A. Real-time Cell Phone Tracking and Secrecy 
In the context of criminal investigations, there are only two statutory 
authorities that explicitly authorize the interception of communications 
information in real-time: the Wiretap Act52 and the Pen/Trap statute.53 
Consequently, when the government wants to use a new surveillance 
                                                
49  See John Kelly, Cellphone data spying: It’s not just the NSA, USA TODAY, Dec. 8, 
2013, http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2013/12/08/cellphone-data-spying-nsa-
police/3902809/ (“Initially developed for military and spy agencies, the Sting[R]ays remain 
a guarded secret by law enforcement and the manufacturer, Harris Corp. of Melbourne, 
Fla.”)  
50  These devices send signals like those emitted by a carrier’s own base stations. See, e.g., 
Harris Corp. Product Sheet 1, 
http://servv89pn0aj.sn.sourcedns.com/~gbpprorg/2600/Harris_StingRay.pdf (“Active 
interrogation capability emulates base station.”).  Those signals, of course, “penetrate 
walls” (necessarily, to provide connectivity indoors). See What You Need to Know About 
Your Network, AT&T, http://www.att.com/gen/press-room?pid=14003; see also E.H. 
Walker, Penetration of Radio Signals Into Buildings in the Cellular Radio Environment, 62 
THE BELL SYS. TECH. J. 2719 (1983), http://www.alcatel-lucent.com/bstj/vol62-
1983/articles/bstj62-9-2719.pdf. 
51 See infra Part II. 
52 18 U.S.C. §§ 2511–2520 (2012) (authorizing the interception of wire, oral or electronic 
communications—including communications content—by law enforcement to investigate 
crimes enumerated in the statute upon satisfying various elements set out in the statute). 
53 18 U.S.C. §§ 3121–3127 (2012) (authorizing law enforcement to install and use a pen 
register device to “recor[d] or decod[e] . . . [non-content] dialing, routing, addressing, or 
signaling information . . . transmitted by an instrument or facility for which a wire or 
electronic communication is transmitted [or] provided” and to install and use a trap and 
trace device to “captur[e] the incoming electronic or other impulses which identify the 
originating number or other dialing, routing, addressing, and signaling information 
reasonably likely to identify the source of a wire or electronic communication, provided, 
however, that such information shall not include the contents of any communication”). 
16
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method to collect data in real-time, it must first determine whether the 
technology or acquisition method fits under these existing statutory 
collection authorities. It must also conduct a Fourth Amendment analysis in 
order to determine if a search warrant must first be obtained. Cell phone 
location tracking represents one example of how the government analyzes 
and implements a real-time law enforcement collection method that has not 
been explicitly authorized by Congress.  
It has already been described in the literature54 and documented to a 
recent Congress55 that nothing in the Electronic Communications Privacy 
Act (ECPA), which includes both the Wiretap Act and Pen/Trap statute,56 
articulates a legal standard Congress intended the government to meet 
before acquiring real-time cellular location data (i.e. tracking a mobile 
                                                
54 See Stephanie K. Pell & Christopher Soghoian, Can You See Me Now?: Toward 
Reasonable Standards for Law Enforcement Access to Location Data That Congress Could 
Enact, 27 BERKELEY TECH. L. J. 117, 134-35 (2012) (explaining how “[l]ocating the proper 
law enforcement access standard for prospective location data in the current law is, in some 
respects, like the quest for the Holy Grail, the search for the fountain of youth, or the hunt 
for a truly comfortable pair of high heels—one is unlikely to find them”); see also Kevin S. 
Bankston, Only the DOJ Knows: The Secret Law of Electronic Surveillance, 41 U.S.F. L. 
REV. 589, 606–09 (2007) (analyzing how the Wiretap Act and Pen/Trap statute do not 
provide the requisite authority for such “tracking” and the Stored Communications Act 
(SCA) only authorizes retrospective access to previously stored communications content 
and non-content information). 
55 See ECPA Reform and the Revolution in Location Based Technologies and Services: 
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties of the 
H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 82-83 (2010) [hereinafter Location Hearing],  
http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/printers/111th/111-109_57082.pdf (written statement of 
Judge Stephen Wm. Smith, U.S. Magistrate Judge, describing the difficulty he and other 
magistrate judges experienced in determining the proper law enforcement access standard 
for real-time location information: “Moreover, none of the other categories of electronic 
surveillance seemed to fit. The pen register standard was ruled out by a proviso in a 1994 
statute known as CALEA. The wiretap standard did not apply because CSI does not reveal 
the contents of a communication. The Stored Communications Act (SCA) standard did not 
seem to apply for two reasons: the definition of ‘electronic communication’ specifically 
excludes information from a tracking device; and the structure of the SCA was inherently 
retrospective, allowing access to documents and records already created, as opposed to 
prospective real time monitoring.”).  
56 Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848 (1986) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 
18 U.S.C.). This Article uses the term ECPA to describe the first three titles of the 
Electronic Communications Privacy Act: Title I (“Interception of Communications and 
Related Matters”), 100 Stat. at 1848, which amended the Wiretap Act (codified as amended 
at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2511–2520 (2012)); Title II (“Stored Wire and Electronic Communications 
and Transactional Records Access”), commonly referred to as the Stored Communications 
Act (SCA) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701–2712 (2012)); and Title III (“Pen 
Registers and Trap and Trace Devices”), commonly referred to as the Pen/Trap Devices 
statute, (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3121–3127 (2012)). 
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device in real-time) from a carrier. Indeed, the only hint from Congress 
suggesting a standard for law enforcement access to real-time location data 
is found in the Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act 
(CALEA), whose limited prescription instructs that “any information that 
may disclose the physical location of [a telephone service] subscriber” may 
not be acquired “solely pursuant to the authority for pen registers and trap 
and trace devices.”57 So CALEA points only to the insufficiency of a 
Pen/Trap order to support a government request for real-time or 
“prospective” (as opposed to “historical”) location data. It provides, 
however, no specific affirmative guidance as to what level of process would 
provide sufficient support.  
Left without explicit direction from Congress, DOJ created the 
controversial “hybrid-order” theory by stitching together the elements of a 
Pen/Trap order and an 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d) order for the disclosure of 
stored electronic communications found in ECPA’s Stored 
Communication’s Act (SCA).58 Since at least 2005, criminal investigators 
have applied for both types of orders from judges when seeking to compel 
carriers to track a cellular phone in real-time.59 Over time, however, some 
magistrate judges have accepted this hybrid theory and some have not. 
Those who have rejected the hybrid theory have required law enforcement 
agents to apply for a warrant pursuant to Rule 41 of the Federal Rules of 
Criminal Procedure.60 
The appropriate standard for law enforcement access to real-time 
location data is, however, still an open question for both Congress and the 
courts. In the interim, a patchwork of non-binding magistrate and district 
court decisions has emerged,61 with only one federal circuit court 
addressing the issue.62 For now, the state of the law can be described fairly 
as a chaotic, “inconsistent legal landscape” that provides no clarity for law 
enforcement, courts, criminal defense attorneys or those citizens and 
advocacy organizations interested the protection of privacy.63  
                                                
57 47 U.S.C. § 1002(a)(2) (2012). 
58 See Pell & Soghoian, supra note 26, at 135-36. 
59 Id. 
60 See In re Application for Pen Register and Trap/Trace Device with Cell Site Location 
Authority, 396 F. Supp. 2d 747, 753–64 (S.D. Tex. 2005); In re E.D.N.Y. Application, 396 
F. Supp. 2d 294, 322 (E.D.N.Y. 2005). 
61 See Pell & Soghoian, supra note 26, at 137-41.  
62 See United States v. Skinner, 690 F.3d 772 (2012) (explaining that the defendant did not 
have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the location that his cell phone was 
broadcasting, i.e., “the data given off by . . .  his phone.”). Id. at 777. 
63 Pell & Soghoian, supra note 26, at 140. 
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Scholars and some courts have criticized the hybrid theory on a 
number of grounds, ranging from its constitutionality64 to whether, 
notwithstanding the constitutional question, Congress would have intended 
to permit the government’s joining of historical and real-time surveillance 
statutes to authorize law enforcement access of real-time location data.65 
Absent better direction from Congress with respect to the appropriate 
standard for law enforcement access to real-time location data, the 
government would need, however, to arrive at some view of the appropriate 
process to follow when engaging in this form of surveillance. Considering 
that DOJ has used the hybrid theory to acquire real-time location data since 
at least 2005, that wireless carriers receive tens of thousands of court orders 
requiring the disclosure of location data per year,66 and that, to date, there is 
still no real clarity in the law, it is fair to argue that judicial review has not 
adequately tested whether the government’s hybrid theory: (1) fully 
complies with the Fourth Amendment;67 (2) is consistent with congressional 
intent; or even (3) is consistent with the plain meaning of the relevant 
statutes.  
Magistrate Judge Stephen Wm. Smith, an early critic of warrantless 
real-time tracking,68 offers an important perspective on why appellate 
                                                
64 See Susan Freiwald, Cell Phone Location Data and the Fourth Amendment: A Question 
of Law, Not Fact, 70 MD. L. REV. 677, 717 (2011) (arguing that courts should require a 
warrant for access to location data in all cases because such acquisition is a search under 
the Fourth Amendment). 
65 In re E.D.N.Y. Application, 396 F. Supp. 2d 294, 322 (E.D.N.Y. 2005); see also In re 
W.D.N.Y. Application, 415 F. Supp. 2d 211, 219 (W.D.N.Y. 2005) (“[T]he challenge here 
is to the statutory justification for . . . [the government’s] application. . . . The Court does 
not agree with the government that it should impute to Congress the intent to ‘converge’ 
the provisions of the Pen Statute, the SCA, and CALEA to create a vehicle for disclosure of 
prospective cell information on a real time basis on less than probable cause.”). 
66 Letter from Sprint to Rep. Edward J. Markey, Co-Chairman, Congressional Bipartisan 
Privacy Caucus 10 (May 23, 2012), 
http://web.archive.org/web/20121110192245/http://markey.house.gov/sites/markey.house.g
ov/files/documents/Sprint%20Response%20to%20Rep.%20Markey.pdf (“Over the past 
five years, Sprint has received . . . 196,434 court orders for location information.”).  
67 One Circuit has held, however, that a defendant does not have a reasonable expectation 
of privacy in the real-time location broadcasted by his cell phone, at least with respect to 
his movements along public thoroughfares.  In this case, the government obtained court 
orders (but apparently not a warrant) to “ping” the defendant’s phone.  Skinner, 690 F.3d at 
776-781. 
68 See In re Application for Pen Register and Trap/Trace Device with Cell Site Location 
Authority (In re 2005 S.D. Tex. Application), 396 F. Supp. 2d 747, 753–64 (S.D. Tex. 
2005) (rejecting the government’s “hybrid theory” and finding that compelled disclosure of 
prospective cell site data is more akin to the tracking device placed under a vehicle, as 
defined in 18 U.S.C. § 3117 (defining a tracking device as “an electronic or mechanical 
 
19
Pell and Soghoian: A Lot More than a Pen Register, and Less than a Wiretap
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
16 YALE J.L. & TECH. 134 (2013)  2013-2014  
153 
review of real-time location tracking and other types of government 
surveillance subject to ECPA is a rare occurrence: for the most part, the 
government is the only party with the ability and potential incentive to 
appeal unfavorable judgments.69 ECPA surveillance orders are issued ex 
parte and often remain sealed long past an investigation’s end.70 A target of 
a sealed ECPA order is thus unlikely to become aware of the government’s 
acquisition of her information unless an investigation proceeds to charges. It 
is at that point, as a criminal defendant, that a target can challenge the 
ECPA order. If an investigation never proceeds to an indictment, the 
innocent target will never learn that a third party disclosed her information 
to the government.71 Moreover, while the third party provider receives the 
order compelling disclosure of information, such disclosure order is often 
accompanied by a gag order.72 The third party provider could challenge the 
gag order, as well as the primary disclosure order, but instances where 
companies have “pushed back” against law enforcement ECPA orders in 
criminal investigations have not, to date, resulted in a steady stream of 
appellate court review.73 In sum, as Judge Smith observes, “[t]hrough a 
potent mix of indefinite sealing, nondisclosure (i.e. gagging), and delayed-
notice provisions, ECPA surveillance orders all but vanish into a legal 
void.”74 
The issues identified by Judge Smith lend discomfiting credence to 
Justice Alito’s recent observation that, “[i]n circumstances involving 
dramatic technological change, the best solution to privacy concerns may be 
legislative.”75 But for the legislature to act, it must, at a minimum, have 
accurate information about how government agencies interpret their 
existing surveillance authorities, as well as the nature of new, unregulated 
surveillance technologies now in use. Judge Smith notes that, although the 
location tracking of cell phones first came to Congress’ attention in 1994, 
nearly two decades have passed without any amendment to ECPA 
                                                                                                                       
device which permits the tracking of the movement of a person or object.”)); see also 18 
U.S.C. § 3117(b) (2012). 
69 Stephen Wm. Smith, Gagged, Sealed and Delivered: Reforming ECPA’s Secret Docket, 
6 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 313, 323-29 (2012). 
70 Id. at 315. 
71 See Memorandum and Order, No. 10-291-M-01 (D.D.C. Nov. 1, 2010), 
https://www.dcd.uscourts.gov/dcd/sites/dcd/files/mag10-291.pdf (holding that the notice 
requirements in Rule 41 are satisfied by notifying the email provider, rather than the target 
of the surveillance order). 
72 Smith, supra note 69, at 323. 
73 Id. at 328. 
74 Id. at 314. 
75 United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 964 (2012). 
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clarifying the appropriate law enforcement access standard.76 While there is 
rarely one reason for why Congress is or is not able to pass legislation on a 
particular issue, one important factor affecting Congress’ ability to legislate 
in the area of law enforcement access to location data is that Congress has 
not had current, accurate data on the nature and extent of cell phone 
surveillance for many years.77 As we will discuss below, the StingRay 
presents even greater challenges to transparency and congressional 
awareness of government surveillance. 
B. The StingRay and Secrecy 
Much less is known about law enforcement use of StingRays in 
criminal investigations than is known about more traditional cell phone 
location tracking. What little is known comes mostly from a limited number 
of magistrate judge opinions, a tenacious criminal defendant seeking 
discovery in his own prosecution,78 and a few obscure DOJ guidance 
documents.79 This section discusses DOJ’s interpretation of the Pen/Trap 
statute as authorizing law enforcement use of StingRays. It argues that, 
given the StingRay’s powerful, unmediated and largely indiscriminate 
surveillance capabilities, a common sense reading of the text does not 
                                                
76 Smith, supra note 69, at 316. 
77 Id. Indeed, public information about the scale of location requests by law enforcement 
was not available to Congress until 2012 when then Representative (now Senator) Ed 
Markey received data from wireless carriers. See, e.g., Pell & Soghoian, supra note 26, at 
158-59 (noting that during the time Congress was considering reforms to ECPA in 2010—
in contrast to information about Wiretap and Pen/Trap surveillance—Congress did not 
“even have a sense of the number and scope of law enforcement requests for location 
information”). Of the carriers that provided data to then Rep. Markey, only Sprint provided 
specific numbers about law enforcement requests for location data. See  Letter from Sprint 
to Rep. Edward J. Markey, supra note 66 (“[O]ver the past five years, Sprint has received 
. . . 196,434 court orders for location information.”).  Additional carrier responses are 
available at Markey Letters to Wireless Carriers on Law Enforcement Requests, WEBPAGE 
OF SEN. EDWARD MARKEY, 
http://www.markey.senate.gov/Markey_Letters_to_Wireless_Carriers.cfm (last visited 
Dec. 16, 2013). 
78 See United States v. Rigmaiden, 2013 WL 1932800 (D. Ariz. May 8, 2013). The 
government prosecuted Rigmaiden for his role in a scheme in which he allegedly obtained 
fraudulent tax refunds for hundreds of deceased persons and third parties.  Law 
enforcement agents used a StingRay device to identify Rigmaiden as the alleged 
perpetrator of these crimes.  In the course of pre-trial discovery and motion practice, 
Rigmaiden, a pro-se defendant, filed substantial discovery requests and motions to suppress 
evidence, some of which related to the government’s use of a StingRay. See Order, United 
States v. Rigmaiden, Case 2:08-cr-00814-DGC, (No. 1009) (Mar. 08, 2013) (on file with 
the Journal). 
79 See supra Part II. 
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provide adequate notice to legislators that the Pen/Trap statute purportedly 
authorizes law enforcement use of a StingRay in criminal investigations. 
Such lack of notice, when compounded with the propensity for ECPA 
orders to vanish into a legal void80 without revealing how DOJ and 
magistrate judges are interpreting surveillance authorities, severely restricts 
(even undermines) the ability of Congress to conduct meaningful oversight 
of government surveillance and to regulate new surveillance technologies 
and methods.  
The crux of our argument is not that it is impossible to read the plain 
text of the Pen/Trap statute as being applicable to the StingRay but that, as 
collection capabilities expand in power and scope (as we have seen occur 
with the NSA’s domestic telephony data collection program), government 
lawyers may interpret the text of statutes to authorize greater surveillance 
powers than a plain reading of the text would disclose or suggest. 
Moreover, through examining two magistrate court opinions discussing 
StingRay technology, we will illustrate the limited ability magistrate judges 
have to restrain government power when there is no statute directly 
authorizing or limiting a surveillance method or technology. First, however, 
we will discuss the parameters of the Pen/Trap statute itself.  
The Pen/Trap statute authorizes law enforcement agencies, upon 
obtaining a Pen/Trap order from a court, to compel providers to disclose, in 
real-time, various types of transactional information pertaining to wire or 
electronic communications.81 The statute references a “telephone line or 
other facility to which the pen register or trap and trace is to be attached or 
applied,”82 and the standard for such issuance is extraordinarily low.83 
Indeed, the government need only certify that the information “likely to be 
obtained is relevant to an ongoing criminal investigation.”84 
Assuming that the magistrate judge finds that the Pen/Trap statute 
authorizes the kind of collection that the government seeks, then, upon such 
                                                
80 See Smith, supra note 69, at 314. 
81 See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3121-3124 (2012) (defining the relevant transactional information as 
“dialing, routing, addressing, and signaling information used in the processing and 
transmitting of wire or electronic communications” (Section 3121); describing the 
Pen/Trap application process (Section 3122); explaining the circumstances and standards 
governing a court’s issuance of a Pen/Trap order (Section 3123); and mandating 
requirements for third party assistance for installation of a Pen/Trap order (Section 3124)). 
82 18 U.S.C. § 3123(b)(1)(A) (2012). 
83 Location Hearing, Written Statement of Judge Smith, supra note 55, at 92 Exhibit A 
(illustrating the Pen/Trap standard as the lowest of standards found in the surveillance 
statutes requiring court approval). 
84 18 U.S.C. §§ 3122(b)(2), 3123(a)(1) (2012). 
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certification, the court must grant the application.85 It is for this reason that 
at least one circuit court has characterized the role of magistrate judges in 
such instances as being “ministerial in nature.”86 In other words, when 
granting the Pen/Trap order, the magistrate does not examine or analyze 
whether there are sufficient facts to support the government’s certification 
that the information sought is relevant to an ongoing criminal investigation. 
The Pen/Trap statute arguably authorizes the government to compel 
production of a broad array of both telephony and Internet data.87 While 
DOJ’s public manual on “Searching and Seizing Computers” does not give 
a detailed list of all of the specific types of transactional information that 
can be obtained with a Pen/Trap Order, it notes that the statute’s reference 
to “‘dialing, routing, addressing [and/or] signaling information’ 
encompasses almost all non-content information in a communication.”88  
Given the broad array of real-time data that the Pen/Trap statute 
appears to authorize the government to compel from a third party provider, 
does a plain reading of the statute suggest that it also authorizes law 
enforcement to use a sophisticated technological device to impersonate a 
cell site operated by the target’s cellular provider and collect such 
                                                
85 See 18 U.S.C. § 3123(a) (“Upon an application made under section 3122(a)(1), the court 
shall enter an ex parte order authorizing the installation and use of a pen register or trap 
and trace device anywhere within the United States, if the court finds that the attorney for 
the Government has certified to the court that the information likely to be obtained by such 
installation and use is relevant to an ongoing criminal investigation.” (emphasis added)). 
86 United States v. Fregoso, 60 F.3d 1314, 1320 (8th Cir. 1995) (“The judicial role in 
approving use of trap and trace devices is ministerial in nature.”). 
87 The statute defines the non-content data that the government can acquire with a Pen/Trap 
order as “dialing, routing, addressing, and signaling information used in the processing and 
transmitting of wire or electronic communications.” 18 U.S.C. § 3121(c). 
88 Computer Crime and Intellectual Prop. Section, Criminal Div., Searching and Seizing 
Computers and Obtaining Electronic Evidence in Criminal Investigations, U.S. DEP’T OF 
JUSTICE, at 154 (3rd ed.  2009) [hereinafter DOJ Manual] (emphasis added). 
http://www.justice.gov/criminal/cybercrime/docs/ssmanual2009.pdf. With respect to 
telephony metadata, the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) has interpreted the scope of 
the DOJ’s statement to include: the numbers a phone calls and receives; the starting and 
ending of each call; the duration of each call; whether each call was connected or went to 
voicemail; and (although a disputed, controversial use of Pen/Trap) “post-cut-through 
dialed digits” (digits after a call is connected, like a banking PIN number or a prescription 
refill number). With respect to Internet metadata, EFF speculates that the Pen/Trap statute 
may authorize real-time collection of addresses of sent and received email; the time each 
email is sent or received; the size of each email that is sent or received; IP (Internet 
Protocol) addresses to include IP addresses of other computers a target computer exchanges 
information with, as well as the communications ports and protocols used (which, in turn, 
can be used to determine the types of communications sent and the types of applications 
used). See “Pen Registers” and “Trap and Trace Devices,” EFF SURVEILLANCE SELF-
DEFENSE BLOG, https://ssd.eff.org/wire/govt/pen-registers. 
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information, without the assistance of a third party? Moreover, does a plain 
reading of the statute suggest that law enforcement is authorized to use a 
device that may, in the process of collecting data about a target’s device, 
also collect data about a significant number of innocent third parties, 
depending on how the device is used?89 In posing these questions, we are 
moving beyond a mere inquiry as to whether the statute conceivably 
authorizes this type of surveillance to ask whether legislators are on notice 
that the statute can be, and is being, interpreted to authorize surveillance 
that potentially impacts so many innocent people.  
1. The 1995 Digital Analyzer Magistrate Opinion 
The first published opinion (and one of only a few that are public) 
that helps to address some of these questions came in 1995, when 
Magistrate Judge Edwards took the position that no authority, including the 
Fourth Amendment, either authorizes or limits the government’s use of a far 
more rudimentary predecessor of the StingRay90—a device commonly 
referred to as a “digital analyzer” or “TriggerFish.”91 
In this case, the government applied for a Pen/Trap order to employ 
a digital analyzer to intercept the signals from cellular phones used by five 
named subjects in a criminal investigation.92 Magistrate Judge Edwards 
found, however, that because the digital analyzer was not intended to be, 
nor could it be, physically attached to the cellular phone, the Pen/Trap 
statute was not applicable to its use.93 Judge Edwards also found, pursuant 
                                                
89 See John Kelly, Cellphone data spying: It’s not just the NSA, USA TODAY, Dec. 8, 2013, 
http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2013/12/08/cellphone-data-spying-nsa-
police/3902809/ (“Typically used to hunt a single phone's location, the system intercepts 
data from all phones within a mile, or farther, depending on terrain and antennas.”) 
90 Whereas the StingRay actively interacts with cellular phones and sends signals into the 
homes of the target and anyone else in the vicinity, the Triggerfish passively intercepts and 
decodes the signals sent between cellular base stations and phones. See generally Pell & 
Soghoian, supra note 25. 
91 In re Application of the United States of America for an Order Authorizing the Use of a 
Cellular Telephone Digital Analyzer, 885 F. Supp. 197 (C.D. Cal. 1995). The government 
submitted an ex parte application for an order permitting agents of the Orange County 
Regional Narcotics Suppression Program (“RNSP”) to use a digital analyzer. Id. at 198-99. 
92 The agents likely needed to use this technology because they did not know the particular 
phone numbers of the devices that the targets were using, id. at 199, and thus could not 
seek more specific surveillance assistance from their wireless carriers.  
93 The court further explained its reasoning:  
 
The statutory definition of a ‘trap and trace device’ does not include the 
limitation in the definition of a pen register described above, limiting the 
devices to those that are attached to a telephone line. See 18 U.S.C. 
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to Smith v. Maryland,94 that the government’s use of a digital analyzer 
raised no Fourth Amendment concerns.95 This ruling was consistent with 
DOJ’s position, first publically documented in 1997, that neither the Fourth 
Amendment nor any statutory authority prohibited its use of the digital 
analyzer, as long as the acquisition of non-content data did not involve the 
assistance of carriers.96 While not a legal requirement, DOJ still advised 
prosecutors to seek a Pen/Trap order when using a digital analyzer as a 
Pen/Trap device. Thus, in 1995, it appears DOJ sought court authorization 
via the Pen/Trap statute merely “out of an abundance of caution.”97 
                                                                                                                       
§ 3127(4). Nonetheless, it appears from the construction of related 
sections of the statutes governing trap and trace devices that they include 
only devices that are attached to a telephone line. Specifically, 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3123(b) requires that an order for use of both pen registers and trap and 
trace devices include ‘the number and, if known, physical location of the 
telephone line to which the pen register or trap and trace device is to be 
attached. . . . .’ This limitation on the proscription against pen registers 
and trap and trace devices to prohibit only devices that are ‘attached’ to a 
telephone line cannot be assumed to be inadvertent. In other statutes 
relating to interceptions of telephone communications, Congress 
encompassed, generally, any types of interceptions of wire, oral, or 
electronic communications—regardless of whether the intercepting 
device was ‘attached’ to a telephone line. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2511. 
That Congress did not impose equally comprehensive restrictions on 
lesser interceptions that do not raise 4th Amendment issues, such as those 
made with pen registers and trap and trace devices, is neither surprising 
nor inconsistent. In any event, it must be remembered that the prohibition 
against the use of pen registers and trap and trace devices without court 
order is found in a criminal statute. See 18 U.S.C. § 3121(d). Under well-
settled principles, the statute should be strictly construed, and any 
ambiguity in its scope must be construed narrowly.  
 
Id. at 200. 
94 442 U.S. 735 (1979). 
95 In re Application of the United States of America for an Order Authorizing the Use of a 
Cellular Telephone Digital Analyzer, 885 F. Supp. at 199. The court noted that “[n]umbers 
dialed by a telephone are not the subject of a reasonable expectation of privacy . . . [and] no 
logical distinction is seen between telephone numbers called and a party’s own telephone 
number (or [device serial] number), all of which are regularly voluntarily exposed and 
known to others.” Id. 
96 See Executive Office for United States Attorneys, Electronic Investigative Techniques, 
USA BULLETIN, Sept. 1997, at 13-15, 
http://www.justice.gov/usao/eousa/foia_reading_room/usab4505.pdf  (“it does not appear 
that there are constitutional or statutory constraints on the warrantless use of such a [digital 
analyzer] device.”). 
97 In re Application of the United Sates of America for an Order Authorizing the Use of a 
Cellular Telephone Digital Analyzer, 885 F. Supp. at 200. 
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Although ultimately ruling that the Pen/Trap statute did not 
regulate—and thus did not prohibit—government use of a digital analyzer, 
the judge expressed serious reservations about its capabilities and use. 
Specifically, the judge expressed concern about the potential intrusion upon 
the privacy of innocent third parties. That is, if the court authorized the 
government to use a digital analyzer to identify the particular phones used 
by known targets, such an order would essentially permit agents to sweep 
the relevant surrounding areas and intercept signals emitted from all phones 
in those areas. Indeed, Judge Edwards recognized that “depending upon the 
effective range of the digital analyzer, telephone numbers and calls made by 
others than the subjects of the investigation could be inadvertently 
intercepted.”98 Moreover, although the agents were not seeking to intercept 
communications content, the digital analyzer was capable of being used for 
that purpose.99 
The court also noted that its authorization could permit the 
government to collect data about large numbers of phones without any 
recordkeeping or reporting requirements, thus preventing effective 
congressional oversight of the surveillance tool.100 The court contrasted this 
lack of record production with the statutory reporting requirements to 
Congress in the Pen/Trap statute, such as “the use of court orders that 
identified particular telephones and the investigative agency” and “periodic 
reports to Congress stating the numbers of such orders.”101 Noting these 
differences and others,102 the court stated that the government’s application 
“would not insure sufficient accountability.”103  
The court’s reasoning appears to illustrate broader concerns about a 
circumvention of congressional authority that would occur if the court 
                                                
98 Id. at 201. 
99 See Electronic Investigative Techniques, supra note 96, at 14 (“Although [a digital 
analyzer] device is also capable of intercepting both the numbers dialed from the cellular 
phones and the voice (wire) communications to and from cellular telephones, the digital 
analyzer is programmed so it will not intercept cellular conversations or dialed numbers 
when it is used for the limited purpose of seizing ESNs and/or the cellular telephone’s 
number.”); see also Electronic Surveillance Unit, Electronic Surveillance Manual: 
Procedures and Case Law Forms, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE 40 (2005), 
http://www.justice.gov/criminal/foia/docs/elec-sur-manual.pdf (“Digital analyzers/cell site 
simulators/triggerfish and similar devices may be capable of intercepting the contents of 
communications and, therefore, such devices must be configured to disable the interception 
function, unless interceptions have been authorized by a Title III order.”). 
100 In re Application of the United Sates of America for an Order Authorizing the Use of a 
Cellular Telephone Digital Analyzer, 885 F.Supp. at 201-02. 
101 Id. (citing 18 U.S.C. §§ 3123(b), 3126). 
102 Id.  
103 Id. at 201. 
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granted the government’s request, even “in an abundance of caution.” By 
granting an order pursuant to a statute whose definitional elements did not 
conform to the surveillance technique at issue, the court risked giving: (1) a 
potentially incorrect interpretation of a statute; or worse (2) judicial 
approval of a surveillance technique that Congress appeared neither 
explicitly to authorize or prohibit under the statutory authority presented in 
the government’s application—all without the corresponding accountability 
mechanisms that Congress mandated in the statute cited in the 
government’s application.  
Though it expressed concern about the surveillance capabilities of 
this technology, the court could not restrain its use by law enforcement. 
Ironically, the court’s denial of the government’s application likely 
reinforced DOJ’s stance that it did not need any court authorization for 
future use of a digital analyzer.104 At least in this instance, however, it was 
clear to the court exactly what it was being asked to authorize. A more 
recent opinion suggests that courts are being asked to grant applications for 
the use of StingRays in criminal investigations without appropriate 
knowledge about what the technology actually does—information that is 
necessary to determine both whether the Pen/Trap statute authorizes its use 
and whether the use of a StingRay constitutes a search under the Fourth 
Amendment. 
2. 2012 StingRay Magistrate Opinion 
By 2005, if not earlier, DOJ had adopted the position that the 
Pen/Trap statute, as amended by the 2001 PATRIOT Act, “appears to 
encompass all of the non-content information passed between a cell-phone 
and the provider’s tower.”105 Accordingly, DOJ advised prosecutors to seek 
a Pen/Trap order for all non-content data that agents acquired directly.106 
This was a significant change to DOJ’s earlier 1997 guidance, which had 
interpreted the law to permit unmediated surveillance (e.g. performed 
directly via cellular surveillance technology rather than with the assistance 
of carriers) without the necessity of a Pen/Trap or other court order. 
In 2012, a federal magistrate judge from Texas issued an order 
denying an application submitted by agents from the Drug Enforcement 
Agency for the use of a StingRay.107 The case involved a surveillance target 
                                                
104 See Electronic Investigative Techniques, supra note 96, at 14. 
105 See 2005 Electronic Surveillance Manual, supra note 99, at 45. 
106 Id. at 47-48. 
107 In re Application of the United States of America for an Order Authorizing the 
Installation and Use of a Pen Register and Trap and Trace Device, 890 F. Supp. 2d 747, 
748 (S.D. Tex. 2012). 
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that switched from using a phone known to agents to an unknown phone.108 
The government therefore sought a Pen/Trap order “to detect radio signals 
emitted from wireless cellular telephones in the vicinity of the [Subject] that 
identify the telephones.”109 The agents submitted their application pursuant 
to the Pen/Trap statute110 and 18 U.S.C. § 2703(c)(1), a provision of 
ECPA’s Stored Communications Act,111 and the government informed 
Magistrate Judge Owsley that it was “based on a standard application model 
and proposed order approved by [DOJ].”112  
Since the subject was known to law enforcement (whereas the phone 
number the target was using was unknown), agents planned to identify the 
phone by capturing device identification data “at various locations in which 
the [subject’s] telephone [would] reasonably [be] believed to be 
operating.”113 After reviewing the application, the judge conducted an ex 
parte hearing where an agent leading the investigation indicated that the 
“equipment designed to capture the cell phone numbers was known as a 
‘[S]ting[R]ay.’”114  
Ultimately, the court denied the government’s application.115 Judge 
Owsley expressed concern that the application did not adequately explain 
the technology or “how many distinct surveillance sites they intend[ed] to 
use, or how long they intend[ed] to operate the [S]ting[R]ay equipment to 
gather all telephone numbers in the immediate area.”116 Moreover, the court 
noted that no explanation was given, either in writing or verbally, as to what 
would be done with the “innocent . . . information” collected from the 
phones of uninvolved individuals who just happened to be in the vicinity of 
                                                
108 Id. 
109 Id. 
110 18 U.S.C. §§ 3122(a)(1), 3127(5) (2012). 
111 It is not clear from the 2012 magistrate opinion what purpose this citation to ECPA’s 
Stored Communications Act served in terms of providing additional authority of 
unmediated, direct collection of non-content data in this investigation. The 2005 Guidance 
indicated that only a Pen/Trap order was required for use of devices to collect non-content 
data directly. See 2005 Electronic Surveillance Manual, supra note 99, at 47-48. DOJ may, 
however, have provided updated guidance reflecting a different or more nuanced legal 
position. As of the writing of this Article this new guidance, if it exists, is not publically 
available. The citation to the Stored Communications Act does have a strange similarity to 
the prospective location data “hybrid order.” See discussion supra Part III.A. 
112 In re Application of the United States of America for an Order Authorizing the 
Installation and Use of a Pen Register and Trap and Trace Device, 890 F. Supp. 2d 747, 
749 (S.D. Tex. 2012). 
113 Id. at 748. 
114 Id.  
115 Id. at 752. 
116 Id. at 749. 
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the surveillance target.117 Finally, the court expressed concern that neither 
the prosecutor nor the DEA agent appeared to understand the technology at 
issue and “seemed to have some discomfort in trying to explain it.”118   
At a 2013 symposium at Yale Law School, Judge Owsley suggested 
that:  
The practice of the feds’ not making clear the planned use of 
a StingRay when seeking surveillance authorization could be 
widespread. . . . I may have seen them before and not 
realized what it was, because what they do is present an 
application that looks essentially like a pen register 
application . . . . So any magistrate judge that is typically 
looking at a lot of pen register applications and not paying a 
lot of attention to the details may be signing an application 
that is authorizing a Sting[R]ay.119  
Indeed, a StingRay or similar tracking device appeared to be used in 
a case that made its way to the Seventh Circuit.120 Because the circuit court 
opinion and underlying district court opinion121 never refer to such a device, 
whether by a specific or generic name or other identifying description, the 
only real indication that the Pen/Trap order authorized law enforcement use 
of a StingRay-type device was through DOJ’s disclosure of a copy of the 
opinion in response to a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request 
                                                
117 Id. 
118 Id. 
119 Ryan Gallagher, Feds Accused of Hiding Information From Judges About Covert 
Cellphone Tracking Tool, SLATE, Mar. 28, 2013, 
http://www.slate.com/blogs/future_tense/2013/03/28/StingRay_surveillance_technology_u
sed_without_proper_approval_report.html; see also Jennifer Valentino-Devries; Jennifer 
Valentino-Devries,‘Stingray’ Phone Tracker Fuels Constitutional Clash, WALL ST. J., 
Sept. 22, 2011, 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424053111904194604576583112723197574.html 
(reporting that when a prosecutor was asked by the judge how a court order or warrant 
could be obtained without telling the judge what technology was being used, the prosecutor 
responded “it was standard practice, your honor”).  
120 United States v. Amaral-Estrada, 509 F.3d 820, 822 (7th Cir. 2007) (explaining that “the 
DEA sought and received a court order from a magistrate judge for the application and use 
of a pen register and trap-and-trace device, and to determine certain telephone information 
using the cellular telephone number on Sosa-Verdeja’s phone.”). 
121 United States v. Bermudez, et al., 2006 WL 3197181, at *1 (S.D. Ind. June 30, 2006) 
(explaining that “by using an electronic device and the cellular site information obtained 
based on a court order signed by Magistrate Judge Foster, [a law enforcement officer] was 
able to pinpoint the multi-unit residence located at 5352 West Deming Place as the precise 
location of a particular cell phone”). 
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regarding StingRay devices filed by one of this Article’s authors.122 
Moreover, additional documents obtained from an ACLU FOIA request 
indicate that Pen/Trap applications presented to magistrate judges in the 
Northern District of California did not make law enforcement’s intended 
use of StingRays “explicit.”123  
Notwithstanding his broader concerns, Judge Owsley’s decision to 
deny the application appears to stem from a definitional problem he 
identified in the Pen/Trap statute that, ultimately, the government did not 
adequately address. While recognizing that the PATRIOT Act broadened 
the Pen/Trap definitions, “amplify[ing] the various types of information that 
are available such as routing and signaling information,”124 Judge Owsley 
read language contained in Section 3123(b)(1) of the statute as 
“straightforward in that a telephone number or similar identifier is 
necessary for a pen register.”125 Accordingly, he found that the language in 
the statute “mandate[s] that this Court have a telephone number or some 
similar identifier before issuing an order authorizing a pen register.”126 
Because the government did not provide any support to the contrary 
suggesting that the statute authorized collection of non-content data from 
unidentified devices, Judge Owsley denied the application without 
prejudice.127  
IV. WARNINGS FOR LEGISLATORS 
Together, these two magistrate opinions (one pre- and the other 
post-PATRIOT Act) raise questions as to whether the Pen/Trap statute can 
properly be interpreted as authorizing the use of a StingRay or similar 
                                                
122  Letter from Kenneth Courter, Acting Chief, FOIA/PA Unit, Criminal Division, U.S. 
Dep’t of Justice, to Christopher Soghoian (Sept. 30, 2013) 
http://files.cloudprivacy.net/stingray-FOIA-7th-Circuit-doc.pdf. 
123 See email from Miranda Kane to USACAN-Attorneys-Criminal, U.S. Dep’t of Justice 
(May 23, 2011, 11:55 AM), 
https://www.aclu.org/files/assets/doj_emails_on_stingray_requests.pdf (indicating that 
magistrate judges in the Northern District of California raised collective concerns about 
whether a pen register is sufficient to authorize use of StingRay and TriggerFish 
technology that simulates a cell tower and can be placed inside a van to help pinpoint an 
individual’s location with and that the Pen/Trap applications presented to magistrates were 
not making law enforcement’s intended use of the technology “explicit”). 
124 In re Application of the United States of America for an Order Authorizing the 
Installation and Use of a Pen Register and Trap and Trace Device, 890 F. Supp. 2d 747, 
751 (S.D. Tex. 2012). 
125 Id. (emphasis added).  
126 Id.  
127 Id. at 751-52. 
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unmediated surveillance technology to acquire non-content communications 
data. Beyond parsing the statutory language, however, these opinions 
illustrate how the government seeks to accommodate the use of new and 
powerful surveillance technologies through aggressive interpretation of 
existing statutory language that neither directly authorizes nor prohibits 
their use. 
More critically, for legislators looking at how they can create or 
improve a process for regulating and overseeing law enforcement use of 
new surveillance technologies and collection methods, the 1995 digital 
analyzer opinion illustrates the limited ability a magistrate judge has to 
constrain government surveillance that is neither authorized nor prohibited 
directly by statutory language. The court’s sense of futility is manifest in the 
conundrum of whether it is appropriate to authorize government use of a 
new technology merely “in an abundance of caution.” By denying the 
government’s Pen/Trap application essentially on the grounds that it was 
unnecessary, Judge Edwards likely reinforced DOJ’s view that no form of 
judicial oversight was necessary for law enforcement use of the surveillance 
technology. While this may have been the appropriate legal answer, it raises 
significant oversight concerns. 
As previously indicated, when a digital analyzer or StingRay 
collects data, no corresponding third party records are created—the 
information intercepted is in the sole possession of the agents using the 
StingRay.128 If there is no judicial oversight, then there is no trace or record 
of StingRay surveillance in a particular case other than law enforcement’s 
own elective record keeping systems. While it is not impossible for the 
information to surface as part of the discovery process of a criminal 
prosecution,129 such disclosures would depend on how discovery rules were 
applied in particular cases. In other words, records production in the context 
of the criminal discovery process is not a solid, reliable avenue for 
legislators to learn, in a timely fashion, about law enforcement use of new 
surveillance technologies and government legal interpretations supporting 
their use. 
Conversely, the 1995 digital analyzer opinion also illustrates how 
congressional authority and oversight can be short circuited if a court, “in 
an abundance of caution,” grants an application for use of a new invasive 
surveillance technology when that method is not directly authorized by 
statute and is not apparent to a legislator through a common sense reading 
of the statutory text. In this instance, a court risks giving judicial imprimatur 
to a new surveillance technology in the context of a system in which, as 
                                                
128 See supra Part II. 
129 See United States v. Rigmaiden, 2013 WL 1932800 (D. Ariz. May 8, 2013).  
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Judge Smith has explained, appellate review of ECPA ex parte surveillance 
orders is rare.130 The appellate process is thus unlikely to expose law 
enforcement use of the technology or government interpretations of the 
statutes purportedly authorizing such use within anything approaching a 
timely notice period that would facilitate either congressional oversight or 
legislative action.131 Moreover, as Judge Owsley has noted, it is possible 
that magistrate judges have authorized law enforcement use of StingRays in 
various cases without even knowing or understanding what they were 
authorizing. If true, this practice adds an additional layer of complication to 
congressional notice and oversight, since only elements of the Executive 
branch may know about law enforcement use of new surveillance 
technologies in criminal investigations. 
V. SUGGESTIONS FOR REFORM 
After many months of almost weekly disclosures about classified 
NSA intelligence programs, we have begun to understand how, at times, 
government agencies will interpret statutory language to authorize bulk, 
indiscriminate collection in a way that is not apparent from a plain reading 
of the statutory text. While some members of Congress were aware of this 
type of collection in the context of the Section 215 metadata program, we 
have argued that the StingRay has significantly expanded the government’s 
surveillance capabilities in criminal investigations while it has, 
nevertheless, gone largely unnoticed and unregulated. Indeed, a plain 
reading of the Pen/Trap statute would not put a legislator on sufficient 
notice that the government was interpreting the statute to authorize 
StingRay surveillance.132 While we are not suggesting that no congressional 
                                                
130 See supra Part III.A. 
131 See discussion, supra, Part III.A. 
132 DOJ’s conclusion that Pen/Trap now encompasses all non-content data between a cell 
phone and a cell tower relies, in part, on its analysis of the relevant but “scant” legislative 
history which suggested that the new definitions were intended to apply to “all 
communications media, instead of focusing on traditional telephone calls.” 2005 Electronic 
Surveillance Manual, supra note 99, at 46. Examining, for example, House language 
referencing “a packet requesting a telnet session—a piece of information passing between 
machines in order to establish a communication session for the human user,” DOJ suggests 
that the term “provides a close analogy to the information passing between a cell phone and 
the nearest tower in the initial stages of a cell phone call.” Id. at 46-47. Moreover, in 
contrast to earlier Pen/Trap definitions that referenced the attachment of a Pen/Trap device 
to a phone line, the House Report recognized that Pen/Trap devices could “collect 
information remotely.” Id. at 47. We find it difficult to conclude from DOJ’s analysis of 
this “scant” legislative history that Congress had specific and sufficient notice regarding 
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staffer or Member of Congress is aware of the StingRay family of 
technologies and their capabilities, there is no public evidence that Congress 
has formally evaluated the privacy implications of law enforcement use of 
such unmediated, indiscriminate surveillance methods.133 Moreover, given 
the scant number of published cases illustrating a court’s analysis and 
interpretation of statutes that may authorize law enforcement use of the 
StingRay family of technologies, it would be unrealistic to expect judicial 
review to facilitate meaningful notice to Congress in anything approaching 
a timely fashion.134 The StingRay, therefore, illustrates a larger gap in 
congressional oversight insofar as new, invasive surveillance technologies 
and collection methods not directly authorized by Congress can be used, 
often for decades, without any reliable notice to Congress about their use. 
Simply put, before Congress can begin to regulate new surveillance 
technologies and methods, it must have some notice of their nature and 
actual or likely use. An authoritative, reliable mechanism is needed to 
produce information that can provide such notice.  
As part of the Administration’s response to the summer 2013 
Snowden disclosures, which began with the revelation of the 215 metadata 
program, President Obama announced his intention to convene an outside 
group of experts to conduct a full review of NSA surveillance programs and 
issue a report about how these programs impact security, privacy and 
foreign policy.135 This expert panel has since issued its report, which 
provided, among other things, recommendations about possible reforms to 
                                                                                                                       
the privacy implications of the StingRay and, in amending the Pen/Trap statute, knowingly 
authorized law enforcement use of this technology.  
133 The one exception we know of is a January 28, 2014 public State Congressional 
oversight hearing (meeting) in the Minnesota House of Representatives House Civil Law 
Committee that explored state and local law enforcement use of cellular interception 
devices.  See Minn. H.R. Civil Law Committee Audio & Video Archives, 
http://www.house.leg.state.mn.us/audio/archivescomm.asp?comm=88003&ls_year=88. 
The hearing took place because a bi-partisan group of State legislators’ concerns about the 
technology were not satisfied by written correspondence from the Minnesota Public Safety 
Commissioner. See Camey Thibodeau, Cell Phone Tracking Devices Available to Police, 
FARIBAULT DAILY NEWS, Feb. 4, 2014, 
http://www.southernminn.com/faribault_daily_news/news/local/article_b6719fc2-2656-
51c4-89e3-861e6179b2fe.html (“Privacy concerns related to the devices were addressed at 
an oversight hearing held this week by the Minnesota House Civil Law Committee.”). 
134 See cell phone location tracking discussion, supra Part II.A. 
135 See Transcript: President Obama’s August 9, 2013 news conference at the White House, 
WASH. POST, Aug. 9, 2013, http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2013-08-
09/politics/41225505_1_civil-liberties-oversight-board-open-debate-surveillance-programs 
(outlining steps, post-Snowden disclosures, to foster debate and reform of intelligence 
collection programs including the President’s intent to convene an outside group of experts 
to review surveillance technologies and capabilities).  
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the Section 215 metadata program.136 A far more detailed report focusing 
on the Section 215 metadata program was subsequently released by the 
Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board (PCLOB). 137 The PCLOB is 
an independent, bi-partisian Executive Branch agency authorized by 
Congress in the context of the “war on terrorism” to ensure, among other 
things, that “liberty concerns are appropriately considered in the 
development and implementation of laws, regulations, and policies related 
to efforts to protect the Nation against terrorism.”138  
While Congress has currently authorized PCLOB oversight only of 
government efforts to protect the nation from terrorism (and the recent 
PCLOB report on Section 215 and the operations of the FISC is part of that 
oversight effort), there is no impediment to congressional expansion of the 
PCLOB’s mandate to review, advise, and counsel more generally on 
surveillance technologies and methods that permeate current criminal 
investigations (or those that could reasonably be predicted to do so in the 
future), even if they do not necessarily relate to government efforts to 
protect the Nation against terrorism. Congress could, for example, task the 
PCLOB with studying the specific surveillance technologies and methods 
that are in use or reasonably likely to be used by various law enforcement 
agencies in criminal investigations and the legal authorities the government 
believes authorizes or, conversely, does not prohibit their use. The goal of 
such an assessment should be the production of written recommendations 
by the PCLOB to Congress specifying which technologies are in need of 
                                                
136 Notably, the report recommended that bulk records collected under the 215 metadata 
program should no longer be held by the government, but rather, by a private third party. 
See LIBERTY AND SECURITY IN A CHANGING WORLD: REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF 
THE PRESIDENT’S REVIEW GROUP ON INTELLIGENCE AND COMMUNICATIONS 
TECHNOLOGIES 25 (2013), http://www.lawfareblog.com/wp-
content/uploads/2013/12/Final-Report-RG.pdf. 
137 See supra note 8.  The PCLOB’s Chairman, David Medine, when referring to the 
summer 2013 disclosures stated that “Our [the PCLOB’s] challenge is to understand 
exactly how these programs work, but speak about them publicly in a way that Americans 
can understand the programs and evaluate them. We will work in some cases to have 
information declassified, if it permits us a greater opportunity to explain how these 
programs work . . . . Our view is to try to enhance counterterrorism efforts but also enhance 
Americans’ privacy and civil liberties.” Cogan Schneier, Privacy and Civil Liberties Board 
Works to Inform Public on NSA Leaks, FED. NEWS RADIO, July 25, 2013, 
http://www.federalnewsradio.com/411/3400357/Privacy-and-Civil-Liberties-board-works-
to-inform-public-on-NSA-leaks. 
138 42 U.S.C. § 2000(c)(2) (2012).  Some aspects of the PCLOB’s report pertaining to the 
Section 215 metadata program and dissenting views from two PCLOB Members are 
discussed in the Introduction and accompanying footnotes. 
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direct authorization or prohibition, and which statutory authorities need to 
be updated and amended to accommodate or prohibit their use.  
In service of this goal, Congress should further direct the PCLOB to 
write public reports at regular intervals (which could also, if necessary, 
include non-public or classified addenda) making such recommendations 
and directly identifying privacy issues associated with law enforcement’s 
use of new surveillance technologies or collection methods, as well as old 
technologies like the StingRay, whose current or likely future use gives rise 
to new privacy concerns.139 Moreover, for purposes of conducting the 
investigation and analysis leading to its written recommendations, Congress 
should both direct and empower the PCLOB to talk with all relevant 
government agencies, surveillance technology manufacturers, outside 
technologists and any other parties or entities that would provide relevant 
information.140 
The StingRay and its capabilities invoke several important questions 
that should guide the PCLOB in making recommendations about 
technologies and methods  Congress should regulate directly. This brief list 
is illustrative, though in no sense exhaustive, of some inquiries the PCLOB 
should consider:  
(1) Is the technology or technique in question invasive of 
common and legal conceptions of personal privacy?; 
 
                                                
139 We would suggest that once Congress expands PCLOB’s mandate and authorizes 
additional funding and staff for this purpose, PCLOB be given a year to produce the first 
report, followed by intervals of there years for new reports so that, following the first 
report, there is a sufficient period of time to assess how law enforcement may be using new 
technologies or collection methods and the privacy implications associated with such use. 
140 Under current statutory authority, for example, the PCLOB has the power to: “procure 
the temporary or intermittent services of experts and consultants,” 42 U.S.C. § 2000(j)(3); 
“have access from any department, agency, or element of the executive branch, or any 
Federal officer or employee of any such department, agency, or element, to all relevant 
records, reports, audits, reviews, documents, papers, recommendations, or other relevant 
material, including classified information consistent with applicable law;” “interview, take 
statements from, or take public testimony from personnel of any department, agency, or 
element of the executive branch, or any Federal officer or employee of any such 
department, agency, or element;” “request information or assistance from any State, tribal, 
or local government” and; “at the direction of a majority of the members of the Board, 
submit a written request to the Attorney General of the United States that the Attorney 
General require, by subpoena, persons (other than departments, agencies, and elements of 
the executive branch) to produce any relevant information, documents, reports, answers, 
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(2) Does it challenge a common-sense understanding of the 
statutory text that the government interprets to authorize its 
use?; 
 
(3) Is it an indiscriminate collection method that intercepts 
data from innocent cell phones in the coverage area of the 
mobile device being targeted?; 
 
(4) Is it an unmediated surveillance method that leaves no 
trace of its use beyond internal government agency records?; 
and 
 
(5) Might it, without such oversight or other regulation, 
otherwise remain hidden from any degree of public 
perception or scrutiny? 
These questions suggest what we would describe as a minimal 
examination of the privacy implications and potential need for regulation of 
law enforcement use of any new technology or novel technique, particularly 
an unmediated surveillance device like the StingRay.  The lines of inquiry 
encompass the interaction between a specific surveillance technology or 
technique and relevant cultural norms regarding the expectation of privacy, 
the specific legal interpretations the government would employ to support 
its use, the scope of the data collection involved, as well as the physical 
index, if any, present during its use and the record or trace, if any, it leaves 
afterwards. 
VI. CONCLUSION  
Knowledge and perception must precede oversight. Congress cannot 
understand or regulate a surveillance technology it cannot “see” clearly, 
whether through conceptual understanding of its operation before the fact or 
actual analysis of the history of its use. The StingRay is a law enforcement 
surveillance technology that has, for nearly two decades, evaded direct 
congressional scrutiny, much less informed authorization or 
regulation. Moreover, the StingRay illustrates how law enforcement 
agencies can use surveillance technologies and methods, justified by 
expansive and potentially problematic interpretations of existing statutes, 
for years before they ever come to the attention of Congress—if they ever 
do. We have thus argued that an authoritative, reliable procedure must be 
established to put Congress on notice about the functions, capabilities and 
historical use, if any, of new surveillance technologies and methods if the 
law is ever to keep pace with technological change.  As they are for the 
36
Yale Journal of Law and Technology, Vol. 16 [2014], Iss. 1, Art. 4
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjolt/vol16/iss1/4
 A LOT MORE THAN A PEN REGISTER, AND LESS THAN A WIRETAP 
170 
newest of technologies, the need for such procedures is applicable even to 
decades-old technologies like the StingRay, whose expanding surveillance 
capabilities, combined with its increasing frequency of use by law 
enforcement at ever-descending costs,141 invoke privacy implications not 
heretofore appreciated. 
Indeed, we are entering an era where law enforcement agencies have 
the technical capability to hack into the computers and phones of 
surveillance targets, allowing them covertly to activate webcams and 
microphones, search through documents, and obtain a person’s web 
browsing history.142 These capabilities have been acquired and used without 
                                                
141 For a discussion of the declining costs of cellular interception technology and 
corresponding frequency of use by law enforcement, see generally Pell & Soghoian, supra 
note 25. 
142 See Jennifer Valentino-DeVries and Danny Yadron, FBI Taps Hacker Tactics to Spy on 
Suspects, WALL ST. J., Aug. 3, 2013, 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887323997004578641993388259674.html 
(“Law-enforcement officials in the U.S. are expanding the use of tools routinely used by 
computer hackers to gather information on suspects . . . . With such technology, the bureau 
can remotely activate the microphones in phones running Google Inc.’s Android software 
to record conversations, one former U.S. official said. It can do the same to microphones in 
laptops without the user knowing.”);   
see also Craig Timberg and Ellen Nakashima, FBI’s search for ‘Mo,’ Suspect in Bomb 
Threats, Highlights Use of Malware for Surveillance, WASH. POST, Dec. 6, 2013, 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/2013/12/06/352ba174-5397-11e3-9e2c-
e1d01116fd98_story.html (“Such high-tech search tools, which the FBI calls “network 
investigative techniques,” have been used when authorities struggle to track suspects who 
are adept at covering their tracks online. The most powerful FBI surveillance software can 
covertly download files, photographs and stored e-mails, or even gather real-time images 
by activating cameras connected to computers, say court documents and people familiar 
with this technology. . . . The FBI has been able to covertly activate a computer’s camera 
— without triggering the light that lets users know it is recording — for several years, and 
has used that technique mainly in terrorism cases or the most serious criminal 
investigations, said Marcus Thomas, former assistant director of the FBI’s Operational 
Technology Division in Quantico.”); see also Kevin Poulsen, FBI Admits It Controlled Tor 
Servers Behind Mass Malware Attack, WIRED, Sept. 13, 2013, 
http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2013/09/freedom-hosting-fbi/ (“[T]he FBI yesterday 
acknowledged that it secretly took control of Freedom Hosting last July, days before the 
servers of the largest provider of ultra-anonymous hosting were found to be serving custom 
malware designed to identify visitors. . . . Security researchers dissected the [FBI] code and 
found it exploited a security hole in Firefox to identify users of the Tor Browser Bundle, 
reporting back to a mysterious server in Northern Virginia.”). 
 
For examples of actual court documents pertaining to law enforcement hacking, see Search 
Warrant Application, 1:12-sw-05685-KMT (D. Colo. Oct. 9, 2012) (application from the 
ATF for a warrant seeking permission to use a “Network Investigative Technique” to 
remotely search the computer of an individual believed to be making bomb threats); In re 
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any public congressional hearings or other open debate, much less any 
explicit legislative mandate. As it hints at technological disruptions to come 
and how the legal disorder they bring may unfold, the StingRay offers 
strong evidence that now is the time to establish a reliable mechanism that 
will be a continuous source of useful guidance to Congress as more 
powerful surveillance tools emerge and evolve to challenge the very notion 
of privacy as they strengthen the ability of the government to monitor and 
control the lives of its citizens. For more new and powerful surveillance 
tools shall certainly emerge in the coming age than are “dreamt of in 
[our] philosophy” of personal privacy or its current practical expression in 
our laws.143 
 
                                                                                                                       
Warrant to Search a Target Computer at Premises Unknown, No. H-13-234M (S.D. Tex. 
Apr. 22, 2013),  
http://files.cloudprivacy.net/Order%20denying%20warrant.MJ%20Smith.042213.pdf 
(court order denying an application from the FBI to surreptitiously install data extraction 
software on the computer of a target). Reporter Jennifer Valentino-Devries noted that 
“[t]he judge’s order said the data the FBI could obtain includes ‘search terms that the user 
entered into any Internet search engine, and records of user-typed Web addresses.’ The 
government also is seeking email contents, documents and chat-messaging logs on the 
computer, as well as to take photographs for 30 days using the computer's built-in camera, 
the document states.”) Judge Denies FBI Request to Hack Computer in Probe, WALL ST. 
J., Apr. 24, 2013, 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887324743704578443011661957422.html.  
143 “There are more things in heaven and earth Horatio, Than are dreamt of in your 
philosophy.” WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, HAMLET act 1, sc. 5. 
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